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Joseph Gold joined the Legal Department of the International Monetary Fund in
1946 and served as the Fund's General Counsel from 1960 until 1979 when he retired
from active service to become its Senior Consultant. During nineteen years of his tenure,
he served as the most senior staff member of the Fund. In this capacity he participated
in the general strategy of the organization and oversaw nearly every one of its significant
decisions. The times during which he served were stormy and momentous, characterized
by local as well as more general economic problems and haunted by the potential for
serious world financial crisis. History records the initial dollar shortage suffered by war
torn Europe and the less developed countries, the related payment imbalances experi-
enced by so many countries seeking to gain or regain a level of comfort for their citizenry,
the reversal of the dollar problem when it appeared that the U.S. balance of payments
deficit had led to an apparent dollar glut among the recovering developed countries, the
fear that the solution of this deficit would once again lead to a shortage of dollars and
a lack of the liquidity needed to finance world trade, a potentially catastrophic failure
of the par value system and the gold exchange system that underlay it, and the radical
reconstitution of the failed framework. Every year new and unexpected challenges beset
the world's financial system. Even as old problems like exchange restrictions, multiple
Robert C. Effros, International Monetary Fund, Legal Department, Washington, DC.
The opinions expressed in this paper are those 'of the writer and do not necessarily express
the views of the International Monetary Fund.
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currency practices, and inadequate adjustment financing were being addressed, new phe-
nomena appeared both as problems and as solutions: Eurodollars, petrodollars, capital
flight, international banking, and debt problems were added to the panorama. Despite
these worrisome challenges and the particular setbacks that they sometimes produced, by
more general yardsticks the standards of well being increased for many of the countries
and their inhabitants and the kind of worldwide economic disaster that had character-
ized the 1930s never materialized. Was the world merely fortunate in the postwar years,
as it had previously been unfortunate prior to the war, so as to suggest a sort of equilib-
rium in the affairs of mankind? Or is it possible that the adroit use of new knowledge
and analysis and the skillful fashioning of new remedies contributed to the welcome
outcome? It is the purpose of this paper to inquire more closely into these questions.
A caveat is necessary to the reader: It is not within the scope of this paper to
provide an intensive analysis of the intricacies of the International Monetary Fund or
to chronicle in detail the history of the era. Such an effort would require many more
pages? The paper is, however, intended to describe some of the issues and the responses
to them in which Gold and his colleagues 3 played a major role, and to place the man
in perspective with his times. In order to appreciate these issues, a summary of some of
the features of the Fund is offered and quotations are provided from Gold's works on
its various aspects.
I. Introduction
Joseph Gold, who was to be knighted by Queen Elizabeth at the height of his career,
was born into ordinary, and by today's standards, even humble circumstances. His birth
occurred shortly before the First World War at a time when the world was at peace,
a belief in progress was premised, and ever rising standards of prosperity and culture
were taken for granted. At that time, the international economy was based on a regime
called the gold standard whose laws were thought to operate automatically and benignly
to adjust the temporary disequilibria that, like the inevitable friction in a motor, was
thought part of the workings of a vast and yet orderly machine. The family into which
he was born was close, and from it he soon learned to appreciate the importance of
careful analysis and its application to life. In one of his accounts, he liked to recall
that his father was not merely content to regard the outcome of a game of chess or
cards with moot acceptance. Instead, his father would analyze the moves and ask the
young son to consider whether, if the cards had been different, or the pieces had been
played with another stratagem, how the outcome of the game would have been affected.
As the young man matured, it became apparent that he was a person of promise and
energy whose personality combined features that are commonly believed to be at odds
2. The reader is particularly referred to the references cited in the footnotes to this paper.
3. Gold served under several Managing Directors and Deputy Managing Directors of the Fund.
He interacted closely with a number of Executive Directors and senior members of the staff.
Particular mention should be made of Mr. J. J. Polak, who was the Economic Counselor
during much of the time covered by this paper. Gold was followed by two distinguished
successors, Mr. George Nicoletopoulos and Mr. Francois Gianviti, who is currently the Fund's
General Counsel.
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with one another. He had, people observed, both a predilection for precision and a flair
for originality. His skills were sharpened in early education and then honed by legal
training first at London University, and subsequently, at Harvard University. It should
be noted that in London in the thirties he was part of a small group of teachers and
students that thought that law must not merely be an arid exercise of logic, but rather,
should serve broader functions in the promotion of welfare.' Here was the germ of
the philosophy that would motivate his actions then and in later life: The logic of the
law should be harnessed to economic realities for the betterment of society. He and his
colleagues founded the Modern Law Review, a legal journal that espoused this cause. He
taught a number of subjects at the universities but found he was particularly interested
in contracts, a subject that would foreshadow his contributions to the development of
the standby arrangement, an important and innovative method of financing the member
countries of the Fund.
II. Some Basic Concepts: The Balance of Payments,
the Gold Standard and Its Alternatives
Before proceeding with the narrative, let us recall our understanding of some basic
concepts. A country's balance of payments for a given period can be defined as a sys-
tematic record of all economic transactions during that period between residents of the
reporting country and residents of other countries. Ordinarily it is prepared in double
entry form much as the familiar balance sheet. The accounts are broken down into cur-
rent account items and capital account items. Current account items include trade in
goods and services. Capital account items are broken down into short and long term
capital movements and may be illustrated, for example, by the transfer of securities.
From the standpoint of an exporting country, its sales (or exports) are recorded as credit
items, while its purchases of goods, services, and securities are recorded as debit items.
The balance of payments must always balance, even as a balance sheet must strike a bal-
ance. Thus the total in the balance of payments on the credit side must always equal the
total on the debit side. This does not mean, however, that the individual items or classes
of items must balance. Thus the export of goods may not equal the import of goods,
the export of goods and services need not equal the import of goods and services, and
there is no reason why the total of capital inflow need be identical to the total figures for
capital outflow. However, the total of the current and capital accounts on the credit side
of the balance must equal the total of the current and capital accounts on the debit side.
If the two sides must balance, the necessary implication must be that any given country
always obtains the funds that it needs to pay for all of its purchases.
If a balance of payments must always balance by definition, what can ever go wrong?
Circumstances may arise when a country's income in the form of foreign currencies
earned from its sale of goods and services, and its reserves of gold and foreign currency,
as well as its credit standing abroad when combined are not sufficient to allow it to
4. See Editor's Tribute by I. J. Norton, 23 INT'L LAW. 799 (1989), constituting an introduction
to the subsequently published Festschrift in Honor of Sir Joseph Gold (1990) (ed. Ebke and
Norton).
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purchase all that it needs from other countries. It may have four responses.5 One response
may be to impose controls or restrictions to hold its imports to an unduly low level.
The result will be a balance struck at a lower level than otherwise would be desirable for
the welfare of the country. In such a case, needed foodstuffs, fuel or raw materials that
would ordinarily be imported may be foregone at a cost to the domestic welfare. A second
conceivable response would be to deliberately run down reserves that had accumulated
as a result of exporting more goods and services than had been imported. Such a course
can only gain temporary respite because, if it is not reversed, it will ultimately lead to
the exhaustion of the country's reserves without solution of the underlying problem that
has given rise to the disequilibrium in the balance of payments. A third response would
be to borrow abroad in order to maintain the necessary level of imports. This option is
available only if there are foreign lenders who are willing to extend the needed credit,
and only so long as they choose to continue to lend. Once again it is unlikely to prove
more than a temporary expedient. A fourth possibility is the receipt of foreign gifts and
donations. Aid programs that might supply such grants do exist, but again, they cannot
be depended on indefinitely.
We have made reference to the gold standard. This was a system that much of
the world relied on in the nineteenth century, and into the early part of the twentieth
century, to foster and adjust the balance of payments of the countries participating in
it. Under this system the currency of each country was fixed in its value to gold. Thus a
dollar might be worth so many grains of fine gold, since it either contained that weight
of gold if it were metallic or, if it were paper, could be exchanged for the metal coin. A
pound sterling would similarly be valued in gold for the same reasons. The consequence
was that the dollar and the pound (and any other currency similarly valued) could be
exchanged for one another at a known fixed ratio. This led to a further result. If, in a
given year, British exporters sold more goods and services to American importers than
British importers bought from American exporters, they could turn the excess dollars
received into pounds, and ultimately the Bank of England could demand the amount of
gold represented by such funds from the American authorities. The latter might satisfy
this claim by shipping the gold to London in exchange for the amount of dollars that
had found their way into the holdings of the Bank of England. Alternatively, the British
exporters could tender the excess dollars directly to the American authorities in return
for gold, and have the gold shipped to England.
If this process continued, the United States would be seen to be losing gold in
order to maintain its desired level of imports from Britain. In effect, this would be an
example of the second method of satisfying the balance of payments discussed above.
The United States could not do this indefinitely. The appeal of the gold standard was that
it would enforce a correction to these circumstances. It would do this in the following
way. (1) The U.S. money supply would be reduced by the shipments of gold (since
the money supply comprised either gold coins or paper currency that was issued in
direct proportion to it on the basis of gold held at the central bank); (2) the resulting
reduced supply of money would lead to lower prices and wages in the U.S.; (3) American
imports of goods and services (from Britain, as well as elsewhere) would decrease, since
these goods and services would become relatively more expensive by comparison to the
5. See TARSHIS, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE, at 294-295 (1955).
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domestic American prices for similar goods and services; (4) U.S. exports to Britain (and
elsewhere), would increase because U.S. products had become relatively less expensive
than competing foreign products in the markets abroad.
The gold standard had an understandable appeal. In theory it would operate auto-
matically and work the necessary adjustments in the balance of payments of countries.
Just as in nineteenth century physics, the Newtonian universe appeared to operate like an
automatic mechanism without direction, so in international economics, there appeared
to be a corresponding machine that insured a self correcting mechanism tending auto-
matically towards equilibrium. There were, however, problems in practice. First, the
model may not work smoothly. Thus step (2) which posits lower prices in the debtor
country may founder if prices and wages prove obdurate. Secondly, since the adjust-
ment is implemented by internal adjustments that typically result in a contraction of the
economy, those affected by such adjustments and their political representatives may take
action to halt the adjustment. If industry is to retrench, and workers are to lose their
jobs, or have their pay cut, they may resist the indicated adjustments so as to thwart the
mechanism of the gold standard.6
Alternatives to the gold standard are known. Basically they fall into two main cate-
gories: (1) flexible exchange rates, and (2) government controlled exchange rates.
In a system of flexible exchange rates, the currencies of countries are left to form their
own relations as a result of fluctuations in their demand and supply. In our example,
if demand for British goods rises in the U.S., then demand for the pound sterling will
similarly rise in order for importers to purchase such goods for their customers. The
result will be a change in the ratio of the dollar to the pound, with the value of the
latter falling relative to the value of the latter. Like the gold standard, this system works
automatically towards a self correcting equilibrium, since the consequence of such a shift
in the relative values of the two currencies will be that British goods will become more
expensive in the U.S. markets, while American made goods will become less expensive to
British importers. Moreover, it has certain advantages over the gold standard. It works
without the initial need to change domestic prices, wages, and interest rates (although
changes in these parameters may follow). Furthermore, it operates without the need
to transfer gold in settlement of the balance of payments between the two countries.
However, economists and businessmen discerned a disadvantage in the floating exchange
system. Importers, exporters, and producers of goods and services for foreign trade had
to deal with an additional factor when attempting to calculate their margin of profit,
and hence the price that they should charge their customers. This additional factor is the
risk that exchange rates may change to their detriment during the time of their contract.
In a system of government controlled exchange rates, one or more countries may
decide to fix their exchange rates in relation to one another. In order to maintain the
relationships, the governments may buy and sell their own currencies in the markets.
Thus if the U.S. authorities decided to maintain a fixed relationship of the dollar to
the pound, they would purchase dollars in the markets with pounds (or other foreign
currencies) from the official reserves if the pound rose (i.e. the dollar sank) above the
fixed relationship. In this way they would be decreasing the supply of dollars in the
markets so as to raise its price to the desired level in terms of the pound. The policy
6. See LOEWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 10 (1977).
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would be reversed if the dollar tended to rise above the fixed relationship of the two
currencies. The U.S. authorities would sell dollars in the markets against pounds, so as
to increase the supply of dollars in those markets and drive down the price of dollars in
terms of pounds. This mechanism may help to insulate the domestic economy (of the
U.S. in our example), from the need of making underlying adjustments, at least in the
short term. However, the strategy can work only so long as the U.S. authorities have,
or can obtain, a supply of official foreign exchange reserves from which to draw. The
strategy also presupposes that the fixed relationship that the authorities have selected
and committed to defend is realistic, and based on a proper consideration of the relative
terms of trade. If the fixed relationship is not realistic (or not seen to be so by market
participants), it will need at some point to be changed. This change may take place
through a devaluation (reduction in value), or a revaluation (increase in the value) of
the currency. It should be noted that in an attempt to defend the fixed rate, a country
may use other methods. Thus it may require exporters to surrender all foreign exchange
to the central bank, and then allocate such exchange to importers according to some
schedule of preferences.
The gold standard had been adopted by Great Britain and had been followed by
many other countries. The exigencies of the First World War forced the abandonment
of the gold standard by countries that had to marshal all their strength regardless of
economic niceties. Great Britain attempted to resume its adherence to the gold standard
after the conclusion of the war, but permanently abandoned it in 1931. By this point the
Great Depression had struck. Over the next decade, the world experienced its greatest
collapse of commodity prices and shrinkage of world trade. In the three years between
1929 and 1932, the world price index fell by 47.5 per cent and the gold value of world
trade fell by 63 per cent.7 Faced with deflationary pressures, many countries sought
ways to defend themselves. One way adopted by many countries, sooner or later, was
to devalue the currency. This led to a spiral of competitive devaluations among the
countries and the introduction of restrictions on trade and exchange.
III. The Background of Events
As early as 1942, the U.S. and U.K. authorities were circulating to each other plans
for the postwar international financial framework that would eventually give rise to
the International Monetary Fund. By this time the verities of progress, prosperity, and
enlightenment that had been everyone's birthright in an earlier generation, had been
swept away under the relentless battering of two world wars, punctuated by the most
severe depression that the world had ever known. But now a new vision was needed,
one that would accord with Winston Churchill's wartime evocation of a post war era
into which the nations would be ushered, an era of "broad, sunlit uplands." Negotiations
for the establishment of new international institutions had proceeded apace as the Allied
governments considered what the shape of the postwar economic arrangements should
be. It was recognized by all that the world could not merely resile into the dysfunc-
tions of the thirties. Then when general economic disaster had struck in the form of the
7. See HORSEFIELD, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1945-1965 vol. 1, at 4 (1969).
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Great Depression, there had been little, or no, coordinated effort between the nations for
recovery. Instead, unfettered economic nationalism had led to destructive competition
between them. Countries reeling in a vortex of unemployment and idled industry, had
sought to promote their products abroad, while simultaneously keeping those of other
nations from entering their ports. It was obvious that such policies were inherently con-
tradictory, since a trading partner needed ways to earn the wherewithal to pay for the
exports it purchased. If the exporting country denied its importing partner the way to
obtain the funds needed to pay for the exports, it could hardly expect its partner to
continue to buy its products. Nevertheless, countries had persisted in this ill-considered
strategy. They had done this by a variety of ways, imposing obstructions to both trade
and to payment. Trade measures to accomplish these goals were already well known.
Tariffs could be raised to make goods from abroad more costly in the home markets,
and quantitative ceilings could be directly applied to keep the foreign goods out. But
trade obstacles were not the only way to protect and foster the home industries. Payment
was the other side of trade. The exchange value of one's currency could be devalued so
that the nation's goods could be sold at cheaper prices in markets abroad, thus under-
selling those of the foreign competitors. Exchange restrictions could be mandated so
that importers in the home country would be unable to *obtain the foreign exchange
needed to purchase imports from abroad. In the end, all these measures, designed to
hinder international trade both directly and by erecting hindrances to payment, had had
their effect. During the depression years world trade had shrunk precipitously. Instead
of providing an elixir to recovery by stimulating demand for production, each nation's
beggar thy neighbor policies had resulted in a general diminution of demand, and a
further idling of men and machines. Hard times had only led to radical political solu-
tions. Demagogues who would have been summarily ignored in more normal times,
had stepped forward out of the misery and chaos. They had espoused irrational causes,
ranted at scapegoats, and imposed a lawless uniformity by force. Lines had been drawn
and overstepped, and finally, the world had experienced the savagery and evil of the Sec-
ond World War. Allied statesmen knew "zat this cycle of events could never be allowed
to repeat itself.
IV. The Negotiation of the Fund's Articles of Agreement
Negotiations between the U.S. and U.K. authorities proceeded apace. Consultations
were held in Washington from September 15 through October 9, 1943. These led to a
Joint Statement that was published in April 1944, and a preliminary drafting conference
at Atlantic City in June. A land mark meeting was convened on July 1, 1944 at Bretton
Woods, New Hampshire, with delegates from 44 members of the United and Associated
Nations, and others in attendance. The purpose of the meeting was to consider the shape
of the postwar economic arrangements, and to hammer out the constituent documents
necessary to create it. Although two institutions resulted from the deliberations of the
participants, in fact three had been envisaged. The two international financial institu-
tions that were established were the International Monetary Fund (IMF or "Fund") and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The third institu-
tion that was envisaged was a world trade organization, some of whose functions were
performed over the years by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (before the
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establishment of the World Trade Organization in recent years). The IBRD, which soon
became known as "the World Bank," was intended to make long term loans for specific
projects, like dams and highways, to countries that had suffered damage during the Sec-
ond World War, and to countries in the process of development. The IMF was to provide
temporary financial assistance to countries experiencing balance of payments problems
in order to tide them over difficult periods during which adjustments could be made
to their underlying economic problems. In addition, the IMF was to preside over a set
of rules that would provide the framework of the international monetary system. The
inaugural meeting of the Boards of Governors of the IMF and the IBRD was convened
in Savannah, Georgia on March 8, 1946. Before the year was out, Joseph Gold joined the
Legal Department of the Fund. His rise in an organization of many talented colleagues
would be rapid and sustained.
V. The Structure of the Fund: Its Four Aspects:
Gold's Reflections and Contributions
Upon entering Gold's office, one's attention was drawn not to standard landscapes
or exotica from foreign travels that could sometimes be found in other offices of the
Fund. Instead, one was faced with an imposing mobile of the type that Calder invented
and popularized. Many of the visitors to Gold's office were acquainted with this type of
abstract art from illustrations and, perhaps, museums of the contemporary. However, it
is unlikely that they owned, or that their acquaintances owned, such art forms. Gold was
a modern man, a collector of fine books, with a taste for contemporary and avant-garde
literature. But the mobile in his office seemed more than a fashionable token of the
times. With its many seemingly independent pieces, each delicately suspended with great
care and precision to form a balanced whole of interrelated components, the mobile
must have symbolized much more than abstract art to the stream of thoughtful visitors
who daily sought his counsel in their ongoing efforts to wrestle with the problems of the
international monetary system. That system too, was composed of many independent
countries, seemingly autonomous and unrelated, but in reality forming a complicated
abstraction of mutual interdependence that, like the mobile, could be stirred by every
passing breeze. It was to address this reality that the complex mechanism of the Fund
was created.
Traditional analysis of the Fund distinguishes four basic aspects of the institution:
(1) the rules of conduct over which it presides, (2) the financial assistance that it provides
member countries, (3) the forum it provides for discussion of matters of common con-
cern, and (4) a source for international liquidity (a feature subsequently added, whose
function has yet to be fully realized). In what follows, we will review these aspects and
consider Gold's reflections and contributions concerning them, drawing from his pub-
lished works and focusing on those matters that particularly engaged his interest.
The first aspect of the Fund that invited inspection was the notion of rules of conduct
that would form a framework for the postwar international monetary system. Rules suggest
a legal connotation, and the reader may well appreciate the role that the General Counsel
must play in their development and elucidation. The interpretation of these rules was
often the main work on Gold's desk. A guiding principle of the rules would be that rates
of exchange between currencies are not manifestations of unfettered sovereignty to be
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left to each country to determine unilaterally, without regard for their effect on other
countries or the system in general. Rates of exchange, by their nature, bear on more
than a single currency and hence, are matters of international concern. Accordingly, each
member country of the Fund would be obliged to declare a par value of its currency in
terms of gold (or in terms of the U.S. dollar which itself was defined in gold). This par
value would be established with the assent of the Fund. A member that had declared a
par value for its currency would then be bound to see this value respected in its exchange
markets in relation to all other member currencies, so that the rates of exchange were
within one per cent of the par value for spot exchange transactions.8 This obligation
would ordinarily be carried out through the sale and purchase, by the authorities, of
one or more intervention currencies against the domestic currency (rather than through
mere legal prescription or exchange control). By way of example, if the pound were
falling and threatened to go below the allowed margin, the Bank of England would
purchase pounds on the exchange market with U.S. dollars which it had selected as its
intervention currency for this purpose. The effect would be to create additional demand
for the pound, thus driving its price up. If, on the other hand, the pound rose on the
exchange market and threatened to exceed the allowed margin, the Bank of England
would sell pounds on the market. The effect of this action would be to increase the
supply of pounds on the market so as to drive their price down.
While countries were generally bound to defend the declared par value of their
currency in their foreign exchange market, so as to keep within the permissible margins,
an exception was made for any country whose monetary authorities, for the settlement
of international transactions, freely bought and sold gold within prescribed limits. Such a
country was deemed to be complying with the obligation to defend its currencies within
the prescribed margins. The United States did so purchase and sell gold to the monetary
authorities of other members, and hence was deemed to be fulfilling the obligation to
defend its currency.
A change in the par value of a member's currency could be made only on the
proposal of the member and after consultation with the Fund. Provisions were made to
accommodate minor changes in the par value, but a major change would require Fund
approval on penalty of being declared ineligible to use the Fund's resources.
The par value system had a further corollary. It assumed that the normal situation
where a country had a unitary rate was desirable, and that multiple rates of exchange
were tolerable only as temporary deviations. Multiple rates were sometimes adopted by
countries to give preferred status to different categories of imports or exports, or to
distinguish between those applicable to imports and those applicable to exports. Their
effect required a bureaucracy to interpret the applicable regulations, encouraged attempts
at subterfuge and corruption, engendered inefficiency in trade and settlement, and ulti-
mately undermined the confidence in the currency that employed them. Accordingly,
multiple rates were generally discouraged (although provision was made for their reten-
tion following a member's entry into the Fund, and for their introduction thereafter
with the Fund's approval).
8. A spot transaction is one in which settlement must occur within 48 hours of entering an
exchange contract.
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Another important rule of the new international monetary system was that member
countries were required to avoid restrictions on the making of payments and transfers
for current international transactions, unless these restrictions were authorized by the
Fund. (By contrast, the Fund's Articles allow members to impose controls on capital
transfers).9 A great body of jurisprudence grew up around the obligation of members
to avoid restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international
transactions, and Gold was a major contributor to the development of the concepts.
Thus, a restriction was understood to mean a direct governmental prohibition of, limi-
tation on, or hindrance to the availability or use of exchange in connection with current
international transactions. A restriction was distinguished from a control (which might
merely consist of a procedure that was incident to a payment or transfer of funds). One
type of control that did not rise to the level of a restriction, was a surrender requirement
according to which residents were obliged to surrender to the authorities the foreign
exchange proceeds of current international transactions. Moreover, the obligation to
refrain from exchange restrictions was considered applicable to out-payments, but not to
prohibit the regulation of in-payments by prescribing the currency that residents must
receive. The obligation to avoid restrictions applied to transfers as well as payments,
and this necessitated finding a precise meaning for transfers. In the end, the concept
was understood to mean the ability of a nonresident to convert the proceeds of current
international transactions without the risk of their being blocked.
Another rule that was introduced, was that member countries were under obligation
to avoid discriminatory currency arrangements. In practice a discriminatory currency
arrangement often involved a restriction or a multiple currency practice.
Although the concept is distinct from these other concepts, its interpretation was
not so difficult as the other categories of prohibited exchange practices, and it did not
give rise to the body of jurisprudence that attended the definition of the other categories.
It should be noted that the Articles of Agreement of the Fund distinguish between
two groups of members, those prepared to accept the obligations of Article VIII,
Sections 2, 3, and 4, and those that are not yet prepared to do so, and are therefore,
under the less demanding regime of Article XIV. Countries that opt for Article VIII
status are subject to the rules that prohibit currency restrictions, multiple currency
practices, and discriminatory currency arrangements (although the Fund maintained
the authority to approve them). Countries that opted for the transitional arrange-
ments of Article XIV are entitled for balance of payments reasons to maintain the
restrictions that they had when they entered the Fund. While they may maintain and
adapt such restrictions, they cannot introduce new ones without the prior approval
of the Fund. Any changes in multiple rates must be submitted to the Fund for prior
approval.
9. Payments for current transactions are defined in Article XXX (d) of the Fund's Articles where
it is provided that the Fund, after consultations with members, may determine whether
specific transactions are to be considered current or capital transactions. For a discussion
on proposals to liberalize capital movements, see GIANVITI, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
FUND AND THE LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, IN CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW, at 7 (1999).
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Gold wrote many articles on the rules of the Fund Agreement and their implications.
In a classic summation of the rules of conduct and their intended effect, Gold stated:
The broad effect on private parties of the rules of conduct that bind members can be sum-
marized as follows. Those rules seek to give reasonable assurance that private parties can
deal among themselves on the basis of fixed, unitary, and stable rates; that they will be able
to make payments freely for current international transactions as defined extensively by the
Articles; that they will be able to enjoy freely the proceeds of such transactions; and that
they will not be subjected to discriminatory currency treatment in connection with those
transactions.'
0
Before leaving the subject of the rules established for the framework of the international
monetary system, we should make mention of one that caught the interest of courts and
legal scholars throughout the world, and was of particular interest to Gold. This is the
rule that is set out in Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Fund Agreement:
Exchange contracts which involve the currency of any member, and which are contrary to
the exchange control regulations of that member maintained, or imposed consistently with
this Agreement, shall be unenforceable in the territories of any member.
Before the Fund Agreement took effect, there was reluctance by the courts of one coun-
try to apply the foreign exchange controls of another country. This was the case even
though the controls might be found to be part of the governing law according to the
private international law of the forum. Sometimes exchange controls were referred to
as "revenue," "penal," or against the public policy of the forum. Although the rationale
might differ, the result was often the same: disregard by the forum of the exchange
controls of other nations.
The rule stated in Article VIII, Section 2(b) was controversial, since it seemed to run
counter to the traditional reluctance of courts to grant recognition to foreign exchange
control regulations of other countries, and its effect was seemingly to reverse one of the
purposes of the Fund. Article I of the Fund Agreement states that one of the purposes
of the Fund is to assist in the termination of restrictions in foreign exchange regulations
that impair international trade. However, the Agreement also recognizes that it might
be necessary for a member to retain or impose exchange controls for a time after that
member joined the Fund, and even subsequently, during periods of stress. This is the
rationale of Article VIII, Section 2(b). In an effort to clarify certain complexities of the
provision, the Fund's Board of Executive Directors issued an interpretation on June 10,
1949. The interpretation sets out the principle that if the exchange controls of a member
country are consistent with the Fund Agreement, then exchange contracts involving the
currency of the member contrary to its controls should be unenforceable in the courts
and administrative bodies of all Fund members."
The provision has given rise to more cases and more discussion among legal scholars
than any other provision in the Fund Articles. The courts of countries have divided
on the interpretation of its language. In particular, tribunals in France and Germany
adopted the view that "exchange contracts" should be given a broad interpretation, and
10. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND PRIVATE BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 16
(IMF:1965).
11. IMF, Doc. No. 446-4 (June 10, 1949).
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should mean contracts that affect a member's exchange resources, while courts in the
U.S. and the U.K. have taken a more restrictive view of the concept. The courts have
also divided on when a members' currency is involved for the purpose of understanding
the meaning of "involving the currency." A third issue is the significance of "exchange
control regulations." 2 Gold wrote extensively on Article VIII, Section 2(b), analyzing the
cases and commenting on their rationale. While other distinguished legal commentators
sometimes counseled more restrictive interpretations, Gold took an expansive view of
the meaning of "exchange contracts" and wrote that a currency is "involved" if "the
currency is the currency of the member in which there is an effect on the balance of
payments or on exchange resources. ' 3
The second aspect of the Fund that we will touch upon is the financial assistance that it
makes available to its member countries.14 In accordance with its purposes, the Fund may
make its resources temporarily available to its members in order to provide them the
opportunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments, without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international prosperity. In other words, the solution
to a balance of payments problem would be undertaken during a period of time in which
the Fund would provide financial resources, so as to allow the member to make needed
adjustments without the jarring effects that some countries had experienced historically.
A brief explanation of this process is in order to provide background to the development
of the stand-by arrangement.
When a country joins the Fund, it is assigned a quota on the basis of its economic
size and characteristics relative to other members of the organization. 5 This quota is
used for several purposes, including establishing its voting power and fixing the size of
its subscription to the capital of the Fund. One quarter of the quota subscription of each
member is normally payable in reserve assets (originally in gold, but since the Second
Amendment of the Fund's Articles, in SDRs or currencies of other members) while the
remainder is payable in the member's own currency. The sum of the quota subscriptions
(and any additions thereto consequent to subsequent quota increases) constitutes the
pool of assets held by the Fund and available to finance member needs. (These assets may
12. Gianviti has pointed to four issues of importance. These include the three mentioned above
as well as "whether a court should recognize the exchange control regulations that were
in force when the contract was entered into or the regulations in force at the time of the
proceedings." See GIANVITI, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS, VOL. 1 OF CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS 1, at 8-13 (1992).
13. See, for example, GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS-X 483-484 (1972). For a
different view suggesting that the broad meaning of "exchange contracts" may be too broad,
see Gianviti, supra, at note 10 on page 10.
14. For further elucidation of these matters see Financial Organization and Operations of the IMF,
pamphlet series no. 45 prepared by the Treasurer's Department of the IMF (1998). See also
GIANVITI, MEMBERS' RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE IMF's ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
IN CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS, vol. 3, at 1, 7-13 (1995). Additional
explanation of the Fund's financial assistance to its members is provided in GIANVITI, SOME
SPECIFIC LEGAL FEATURES OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND IN CURRENT LEGAL
ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS, vol. 4, at 1-10 (1997).
15. Initial quotas for original members of the Fund were determined at the Bretton Woods
conference and set out in Schedule A of the Fund Agreement.
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also be supplemented through borrowing arrangements that the Fund has established
with some of its members). That part of a member's quota that is paid in reserve assets
becomes its initial reserve tranche (and subsequently is determined by the amount that
a member's quota exceeds the Fund's holdings of its own currency). A member can
draw up to the full amount of its reserve tranche at any time, upon representing to the
Fund that it has a balance of payments need. 6 It does this by transferring an equivalent
amount of its own currency, so that the transaction takes the form of a purchase that
the member is obliged to reverse by repurchase of its own currency. While the Articles
provide that the Fund may prescribe that a repurchase shall be made within a period
beginning three years, and ending five years after the date of a purchase, provision is
also made (in the amended Articles) for the Fund to change these periods by a qualified
vote.17 A member's reserve tranche is itself considered part of its international reserves,
and a drawing of it does not constitute a use of Fund credit. However, access to additional
resources constitutes the use of credit tranches that are measured as segments, each
equivalent to 25 percent of quota. While originally, there were but four credit tranches,
over time additional amounts have been allowed. The Fund attaches conditions to the use
of these credit tranches that become more stringent in nature as the member's purchases
become larger.
The Fund's Articles envisaged that the resources of the organization would be avail-
able to its member countries through a process of purchase and repurchase. This was
a straightforward method of financing to deal, for the most part, with the immediate
needs of a country. But what if the country did not at present need the funds, although
it foresaw a need over a period of time to have the assurance that it could make drawings
in the credit tranches if these should become necessary? Another method of financing
might furnish the answer.
As early as 1943, in the discussions that had preceded the Bretton Woods conference,
a suggestion had been made that the Fund should be able to make a firm commitment
to supply a limited amount of foreign exchange to a member, to be renewed or not,
at the Fund's discretion at some point during the term of the commitment. 8 After
an initial startup period, in which for a variety of reasons there had been only sparse
drawing by members of resources from the Fund, the Fund staff had begun to search
for a more flexible way than outright purchase-repurchase transactions to make these
resources available. This led to the invention of the stand-by arrangement in 1952, when
the then Managing Director stated to the Fund's Board, the desirability of a means by
which as a result of discussions between them, a country would not necessarily make an
immediate drawing, but would receive from the Fund assurance that it would be able
to make a drawing within a prescribed period of time should the need present itself. By
October 1 of that year, the Fund was able to take a decision on the modalities of the new
instrument. Over the years the instrument was refined and developed, and increasingly, it
was used as the means to provide short-term balance of payments assistance for deficits
16. Requests for reserve tranche purchases are not subject to challenge by the Fund. See Article V,
Section 3(c) of the Fund's Articles of Agreement.
17. See Article V, Section 7(d).
18. See HORSEFIFLD, supra, at 69 and 328.
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of a temporary or cyclical nature. After the Second Amendment of the Fund's Articles,
express mention of it was made in the Fund Agreement by providing its definition.'
9
Gold had participated in the development of the stand-by arrangement and over the
years wrote extensively concerning it. He was particularly concerned with its legal char-
acterization. The primary issue that concerned him was whether a stand-by arrangement
constituted an international agreement between the Fund and a member:
The issue to which most attention has been devoted, has been whether a stand-by arrangement
is the Fund's acceptance of a member's offer to pursue a certain program in the sense that offer
and acceptance have in the law of contract, or, in other words, whether stand-by documents
constitute an international agreement between the Fund and a member, that obliges the
member to observe the objectives and policies contained in its letter of intent. If the answer
were in the affirmative, the member would be in violation of obligations undertaken toward
the Fund if the member did not observe its declared objectives and policies.2"
Gold's conclusions, as was his wont, took account of law, economics, and politics.
They were set out in a tightly reasoned monograph.2' To give some appreciation of his
method of analysis, it is appropriate to summarize them for the reader. Gold reasoned
as follows: The legal characterization of the stand-by arrangement is important because
it has practical and political consequences. The legal analysis must take account of the
responsibilities of the member and the Fund. It is the responsibility of the former to
select and to follow its economic and financial policies and objectives. The responsibil-
ity of the Fund is to satisfy itself that these policies and objectives will be consistent
with the Fund's Articles and its policies. A member sets out its objectives and policies
in its letter of intent, which it addresses to the Managing Director, and the Fund by
its decision, sets out the terms on which the member may draw under the stand-by
without further review by the Fund. The letter of intent and the Fund decision do not
constitute an international agreement under which the member is obliged to observe its
objectives and policies. Since they do not constitute an agreement, nonobservance of the
objectives and policies by the member does not constitute a breach of an international
agreement. The Fund has made it clear to members that it does not intend to contract
when it approves a stand-by arrangement, and hence, an agreement in the legal sense
cannot arise between the member and the Fund. A different conclusion could lead to
undesirable consequences, in which censorious decisions would follow if a member were
found to be in violation of an international agreement by failing to observe its stated
economic and financial policies. It must be held in perspective that economic forecasting
is uncertain and "the legal consequences attached to nonobservance of economic poli-
cies should be commensurate with the state of economic knowledge." The reference in
the amended Articles to a stand-by arrangement, defines it as a decision of the Fund
19. Article XXX(b) provides:
Stand-by arrangement means a decision of the Fund by which a member is assured that it
will be able to make purchases from the General Resources Account in accordance with the
terms of the decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount.
20. Gold, The Legal Character of the Fund's Stand-By Arrangements and Why It Matters, IMF
pamphlet series no. 35, at 2 (1980).
21. See Gold, supra, at 43-47.
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(not an agreement or contract). Other concepts known to legal analysis such as unen-
forceable agreements, gentlemen's agreements, and binding unilateral declarations are
inadequate to explain the nature of the stand-by. The stand-by arrangement includes
obligations arising from the Articles, such as those that require a member to repurchase,
pay charges, or to remain in consultation with the Fund. Consequences may follow from
a member's voluntary disregard of its stated objectives and policies. Thus, the Fund may
take into account a member's record on a request by that member for a subsequent
stand-by arrangement. Among the practical consequences of the characterization that
is favored, is that members are not required to follow their domestic legal procedures
for entry into international agreements, and are not required to take steps to make the
stand-by arrangements effective under national laws as if they were international agree-
ments. Moreover, they are not able to register stand-by arrangements with the United
Nations under Article 102 of its Chapter, which provides that every treaty and inter-
national agreement entered into by a member of the UN shall be registered with the
Secretariat and published by it.
The third aspect of the Fund to be noted, is that it constitutes a forum for the con-
sideration of the international monetary system, as well as, the circumstances of individual
member countries. The structure of the Fund 22 includes a Board of Governors, an Exec-
utive Board, a Managing Director, and the staff of the organization. (Provision has also
been made in the Second Amendment for a Council, if the Board of Governors decides
by qualified vote to call it into existence). The Board of Governors is the senior organ. It
consists of one governor and an alternate governor appointed by each member. In prac-
tice, the governor is usually the minister of finance, or the governor of the central bank.
The Board of Governors meets annually (and may meet more frequently). Its decisions
are in the form of resolutions. Powers not conferred directly on the Executive Board, or
other organs by the Fund Agreement, are vested in the Board of Governors. In practice,
it has delegated those powers that may be delegated under the Fund's Articles to the
Executive Board. The Executive Board is the organ that is responsible for the conduct
of the general business of the Fund. It is in continuous session. Five of its members are
appointed by the five members having the largest quotas, while fifteen others are elected
by the other members. (Provision is made to increase or decrease the number of elected
members through a qualified vote of the Board of Governors, and for the appointment
of two executive directors by the two members that have had their currencies sold by
the Fund in the largest net amounts in the two years preceding the election of executive
directors if, because of the size of their quotas, they are not entitled to appoint their
executive directors). Elections are held every two years. Normally, executive directors are
elected by two or more members, but they are constrained to cast all their votes as a unit
(instead of splitting their votes in the event of a difference of opinion between the mem-
bers). This implies that their function is not limited to merely registering the wishes of
the countries that form their electorate. Neither the governors, nor the executive direc-
tors are described in the Articles as representatives of their members, and Gold, who
22. For a detailed explanation of these matters, see GIANVITI, DECISION MAKING IN THE INTER-
NATIONAL MONETARY FUND IN CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FINANCIAl Law,
vol. 1, at 31 (1999).
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wrote extensively on the subject of voting in the Fund (as well as in other international
organizations), insisted that "when they take decisions as the Board of Governors or as
the Executive Directors, they decide as a body consisting of officers of the Fund, and not
as the 'representatives' of the members that appointed or elected them."23 He was quick
to point out, however, that the fact that, although a "governor or executive director votes
as an officer of the organ to which he belongs, he does not owe his duty exclusively
to the Fund. He is not like the Managing Director and the staff, who 'owe their duty
entirely to the Fund and to no other authority.'"
Voting power is determined by quota which, as we have noted, depends on a coun-
try's relative economic power. This principle differentiates the Fund from some other
international organizations, where the operative principle is one vote for each country.
While a parallel might, therefore, be drawn to the concept of an ordinary business cor-
poration, the parallel is not exact, for each member country is entitled to a basic vote,
whatever the size of its quota, in a nod at the more traditional concept of the equality
of nation states. Tying the dominant power to those members whose economic power
was dominant, in turn, was a nod to realism in an organization whose functions were
of an economic nature. It also introduced a note of efficiency that might be lacking
in organizations based on equality of voting. The membership of the Fund would ulti-
mately exceed 180 countries. If the organization were premised on the assumption that
each was to be allowed to have an equal say on every issue, and, by way of example,
each was allotted five minutes to explain its point of view, then each issue brought
up for discussion would consume fifteen hours (roughly the equivalent of two work-
ing days). In the fast moving world of international finance, such a system would be
unworkable and would only invite disaster. Decisions would, of necessity, have come to
be made exclusively outside the organization and the usefulness of the Fund would have
ebbed.
While a complete exegesis of the complex system of voting provided for in the
Articles would take note of provisions that deal with adjustable voting power, reserved
powers, special majorities, and other aspects of taking decisions, it is especially notewor-
thy that in practice, most decisions are not taken by a process of formal voting at all.
This was not unexpected, for as far back as 1946, Rule C-10 of the Fund's Rules and
Regulations provided that while an executive director may require a formal vote to be
taken, ordinarily the chairman would "ascertain the sense of the meeting in lieu of a
formal vote." Although voting is avoided in this manner, voting power is still important,
since the sense of the meeting was explained in a decision of the Executive Directors to
mean "a position supported by executive directors having sufficient votes to carry the
question if a vote were taken." Gold explained that the Executive Directors try to avoid
confrontation politics and seek instead to "reach decisions in which as many as possible
of their number, considered as individuals, concurs without reference to their voting
strength."24 He explained the rationale as follows:
The Fund has both regulatory and financial functions. It was soon realized that members
are more likely to comply with the decisions of the Fund as a regulatory organization, if the
23. GOLD, VOTING AND DECISIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 99 (IMF: 1972).
24. Gold, supra, at 199.
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decisions are reached by consensus, or at least widespread concurrence. Members of the Fund
as a financial institution can tolerate the idea of the influence of those among them that
have greater financial strength. The recognition of this strength encourages those who possess
it to act with restraint, and to refrain from the exercise of their greater voting power. The
result tends to be an equilibrium, in which the views of the more powerful members may
not prevail, but in which decisions will not be adopted in opposition to them before some
accommodation can be found."
The fourth aspect of the Fund is to serve as a source for international liquidity. Tradi-
tionally, reserve assets were of three types: gold, foreign exchange, and a country's reserve
position in the Fund. During Gold's tenure as General Counsel, a new and innovative
reserve asset would be added.
Gold occupied a central role in the reserves of countries. For many years it was
valued by the members of the Fund at an official price, which derived from the under-
taking of the U.S. authorities to buy and sell gold to monetary authorities at $35 per
ounce. This value reflected the par value of the U.S. dollar, which was equivalent to
.888671 gram of fine gold, and the undertaking of the U.S. authorities to maintain the
value of its currency under the par value regime established under the Fund Agreement.
When private demand for gold began to assert itself, the central banks of several Euro-
pean countries joined with the Federal Reserve in 1961 to conduct sales in the London
gold market, in an effort to keep the private price for gold from rising substantially
above the official price. Following the failure of this effort in 1967, a two-tier mar-
ket developed, and the price of gold on the private market rose markedly above the
official price. The advantage of holding gold in one's reserves was its universal accept-
ability to settle financial obligations. However, it did not earn interest or pay dividends,
and in fact, a holder of this reserve incurred costs in storing and securing (as well as
transporting) it.
Foreign exchange was recognized as a second reserve asset. Foreign exchange has
certain advantages over gold. Thus, a holder does not incur storage or security problems
and the associated costs. Furthermore, it can be invested so as to earn interest or divi-
dends until it is used. Of course, it is subject to fluctuations in value, and may be subject
to restrictions (and for this and other reasons) unacceptable to a creditor in discharge
of a financial obligation.
The third reserve asset was the reserve position of a member country in the Fund. It
was calculated as the extent that the Fund's holdings of its currency were less than its
quota in the Fund. It was the result of the payment of the non-currency portion of the
subscription by the member, together with the subsequent sale of the member's currency
in transactions by the Fund with other members. The right of a member to draw in the
reserve tranche is unconditional, in the sense that it cannot be objected to by the Fund
(unless the member has been declared ineligible to make purchases).2 6 Such a drawing
carries no charge (and following the Second Amendment to the Fund's Articles, is partly
remunerated).
25. Gold, supra, at 201.
26. See Article V, Section 3(c) of the Fund's Articles of Agreement.
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VI. Clouds on the Horizon During Gold's Tenure: The First
Cloud: Disproportion of Reserves to World Trade and the
First Amendment's Creation of the Special Drawing Right
As the years passed, the international monetary system seemed to be operating in a
generally satisfactory manner. The par value system and the associated rules of conduct
had laid the basis for increased trade, and when countries had stumbled into balance
of payment difficulties, the resources of the Fund were available to tide them over
the difficulties, while they made the necessary adjustments without the more wrench-
ing actions that would have been necessary in their absence. Challenges occurred and
required responses, but these were rapidly fashioned with the aid of a highly competent
staff. Nevertheless, there were two clouds that were gathering on the horizon. In a way
they were interrelated, since both involved international reserves. While one was directly
related to the amount of international reserves and provoked a response in anticipation,
the second seemed to break upon the world in a sudden and unexpected paroxysm. In
both Gold played an important role. He often served, not only as the chief legal adviser,
but also as the chief draftsman for the measures that the Fund decided were required. In
these exercises he was not, of course, alone in his endeavors. He was in constant collabo-
ration with the economists who were his colleagues, with Management and the members
of the Executive Board, and with others throughout the Fund. In seeking to craft the
solutions, he often drove himself and the members of his own department at a furious
pace, and it is a wonder that he produced, at the same time, a series of monographs and
articles explaining the changes.
The first cloud that some observers thought they perceived was the relationship of
international trade to the reserve assets that supported such trade, and were available
for its settlement. In the postwar years international trade had grown by leaps and
bounds, and the dire years of its downward spiral in the thirties were rapidly fading
from memory. Competitive devaluations and restrictions on trade and payments, which
had characterized the prewar years, were no longer in the ascendancy. Nevertheless, it
was noted that in 1958 the ratio of the world's reserves to the volume of imports had
been fifty-seven percent. This ratio had fallen to about thirty-seven percent by 1967.7
If this trend persisted, then a time might arrive when the reserves of the world were so
disproportionately small, in comparison to the needs of expanding world trade, that a
crisis would occur and the system would crash.
The situation was disquieting. Gold described it as follows:
If monetary authorities do not have at their disposition, reserves which they regard as ade-
quate, this could lead to a contraction of world economic activity, and a retreat from liberal
objectives, including those expressed in the purposes of the Fund. It is obvious that a world
in which all countries aspire to a surplus in their balances of payments, because they lack
what they regard as adequate monetary reserves or fear that they may not increase sufficiently,
is a world in which expansion as well as logic will be sacrificed. The threat implicit in this
prospect was retrogression to conditions in which individual advantage would be sought, and
27. See LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 102 (1977).
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defensive measures deployed, without regard to the general welfare. A growing worldwide
deflation would be the most likely result. 28
Consider a public transportation system whose fares are settled by tokens. If the
amount of tokens does not keep pace with the growing number of travelers and the
velocity of their use remains constant, then ultimately the expansion of the system must
cease, and the circumstances of its cessation will entail disruption. In the case of the
public transportation system the solution is apparent. The trend must be discerned,
and well in advance of the crisis, additional tokens must be created. The solution to
the problem of the world's reserves however, did not seem so straightforward. This is
because the composition of the world's reserves seemed to compound the solution to the
problem. The proportion of world reserves held in foreign exchange was increasing-
reaching over 40 percent in 1967-and most of this amount was held in U.S. dollars and
pounds sterling. The pound had been in difficulties on and off over the years, while the
dollar, in short supply immediately after the close of the Second World War, was now
being pumped abroad by the persistent deficits in the U.S. balance of payments. Many
economists were predicting that these deficits would be brought under control. If this
were to occur, then a vital source of the world's reserves would be cut off. As for gold,
the supply depended on production decisions in its two largest producers, South Africa
and the Soviet Union, while the demand for its use as a reserve asset had to compete
with the proclivities of investors, speculators, and the jewelry and other industries that
employed it in commercial use. With these variables, gold could never be depended upon
to furnish a reliable increase in the supply of world reserves.
Various proposals were put forward. The Fund's quotas could be increased, so as to
afford each country a greater reserve tranche. But the magnitude of the increases, and
the difficulty and delays of obtaining frequent and tailored increases, argued against the
adoption of this proposal. Perhaps all currencies could be devalued against the official
value of gold, so that the gold held in all countries' reserves would be worth more relative
to the settlement of the transactions between the countries. But this could only be a stop
gap measure, and could hardly be repeated on a regular basis to keep up with the secular
trend of expanding trade. Besides, the effect of a uniform proportionate devaluation of
currencies against gold would inure greatly to the benefit of the two chief gold producing
nations, whose production would now be worth more. There were many that sought a
more equitable solution.
Out of the ferment of ideas, one captured the day. This was to create a new reserve
asset whose supply, instead of depending on vagaries independent of the needs of com-
merce, could be consciously tailored to those needs. The total stock of international
reserves and the rate of its growth could be deliberately and carefully calibrated to the
growth of world trade. Thus was the special drawing right (SDR) born. Gold was in
attendance at the birth of the SDR, serving on the team that gave rise to the concept, and
supervising its legal expression in the First Amendment to the Articles of Agreement.
Gold described its promise as follows:
In the provisions of the Articles that govern special drawing rights, the states that participate
in the Special Drawing Account have a potentially powerful mechanism for affecting the
28. GOLD, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS CHARACTER AND USE 7-8.
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volume of liquidity available to them, and for helping to avoid economic stagnation and
deflation in the world, as well as excess demand and inflation.
29
The First Amendment came into effect on July 28, 1969. Subsequent to the adoption
of the First Amendment, SDR 9.3 billion were allocated to member countries that became
participants in the Special Drawing Account during the period of 1970-1972. Again in
1978-81 a total of SDR 12.1 billion was allocated. The Second Amendment, which came
into effect in April 1978, made some notable changes to the system. The intricacies of the
SDR are manifold and complex and have been described elsewhere.30 However, to allow
a summary understanding of the current system, a few basic points will be mentioned.
The special drawing right was created to serve as a supplement to existing reserve
assets. If the Fund decides to allocate SDRs (or cancel them), it must consider the long-
term global need to supplement existing reserve assets, so as to promote its purposes and
avoid economic stagnation and deflation, as well as excess demand and inflation. There
is a special procedure for proceeding to the allocation, in which the Managing Director,
the Executive Board, and the Board of Governors all take part. An allocation is made for
a basic period, normally five years in duration. The rates at which allocations of special
drawing rights are made are expressed as percentages of quotas. All member countries
are participants in the Special Drawing Rights Department. Recipients of allocations
do not deposit their currency or reserve assets when receiving an allocation. Thus, the
effect of an allocation increases the reserves of the recipients without any countervailing
reduction in them. Recipients of SDR allocations cannot use them in transactions with
private parties. SDRs can be transferred to another participant in return for currency,
and the transferor may use the currency received. Two methods of use are contemplated.
If a participant has a balance of payments need, but cannot find a participant that will
provide currency in exchange for the transfer of SDRs, the Fund may designate a partic-
ipant to provide a freely usable currency. The more normal procedure is by agreement
between participants (or other officially designated holders of SDRs). Rates of interest
and charges are applicable to SDRs. They are the same, so that participants holding more
SDRs than their net cumulative allocations receive payments, while those holding less
must make payments. The Fund holds SDRs in its General Resources Account and is
authorized to use them in its operations and transactions, but is not entitled to receive
them by way of allocation.
The valuation of the SDR and its interest rate are determined by reference to a
basket of currencies. This was not always the case. The initial valuation under the First
Amendment was related to gold. However, this was replaced first by a basket of six-
teen currencies, and then simplified by reduction to five. The SDR is used as the unit
of account in the Fund's General Resources Account, and the value of Fund holdings of
member currencies is maintained in accordance with this unit of account. As a unit of
account the SDR is also employed by a number of international organizations, and to
denominate some financial instruments created in the private market (but these instru-
ments have not given rise to a very large following).
29. GOLD, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS-THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE 1 (1971).
30. See GIANVITI, SPECIAL DRAWING RIGHTS, IN CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL
BANKS, vol. 5, at 1 (1998).
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Although the SDR was intended by the Second Amendment to become the principal
reserve asset of the international monetary system, this goal has not been realized and
the role of the SDR as a reserve asset has remained limited. The Board of Governors
adopted a resolution in September 1997, approving a proposal for a Fourth Amendment
to the Articles to the end of providing the authority for a special allocation of SDR
21.4 billion to raise all participants' ratios of cumulative SDR allocations to quota to a
common ratio of 29.3 percent. Nevertheless, many observers are of the opinion that the
internationalization of finance, and the explosive development of private capital markets,
make it unlikely that the SDR will become the principal reserve asset of the international
monetary system in the near future.3"
VII. The Second Cloud: The Demise of the Par Value System:
Gold's Counsel to Avoid a Legal Vacuum
While the first cloud (relating to the possible disproportion between reserves and
world trade) came to dissipate itself, even while preparations were made to counter its
effect should it ever ripen into a serious threat, the second cloud that darkened the hori-
zon broke with an extraordinary ferocity and led to a radical change in the international
monetary system. It has been mentioned above that the vast dollar shortage that faced
most of the countries in the immediate post war world had been reversed and a threat of
the opposite nature had appeared. The United States had begun to run persistent deficits
in its balance of payments. At first these were believed to be only temporary, but by
1971 the U.S. balance of payment situation was beginning to arouse apprehension both
in the U.S. and abroad. The deficit was the result of deterioration in both the trade and
capital sectors. There had been an acceleration of imports into the U.S. and an outflow
of capital abroad. The largest factor for the deterioration was a sizable increase in short-
term capital outflows. These, together with the trade deficit and an increasing outflow
of long-term capital, had led to flight at an annual rate of more than $22 billion during
the first half of that year. There was little evidence that the situation would improve.
It may be recalled that the rules of the par value system mandated that member
countries defend the value of their currencies in the markets, but recognized that this
obligation could be satisfied by buying and selling gold freely with the monetary author-
ities of other countries for the settlement of international transactions (provided that
the price did not exceed the margin prescribed by the Fund for dealing in gold). While
other countries had largely chosen to defend their currencies by buying and selling
them against an intervention currency, the United States had opted for the latter course.
Accordingly, a system had developed in which most countries were active in the defense
of their currencies, while the U.S. was the passive centerpiece buying and selling gold
from official monetary authorities.
Not all was well. Canada had encountered economic problems and had decided to
float its currency. The Fund had no authority to approve a unitary floating exchange rate
for a currency, and was counseling a reestablishment of the par value of the Canadian
31. See Financial Organization and Operations of he IMF, pamphlet series no. 45 prepared by the
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currency, and a return by the authorities to the obligations of the Articles. Meantime,
speculators and others had begun to sense that the world's currencies had gotten out of
kilter with one another and were in need of adjustment. Some believed that a devaluation
of the U.S. dollar, or a revaluation of the currencies of other countries, would prove
inevitable. A rush developed to buy German marks and other European currencies. The
German central bank, attempting to stem the tide, tried to defend the parity of its
currency and purchased over a billion U.S. dollars during two days in May. On the next
day, May 5, 1971, five European central banks, including the Bundesbank, closed their
foreign exchange markets for the rest of the week. The outcome was that when these
countries prepared to reopen their exchange markets, Germany and the Netherlands
informed the Fund that for the time being, they would not maintain the exchange rates
for their currency within the margins: i.e. both the mark and the guilder would float.
At the same time, Belgium and Luxembourg notified the Fund that they were changing
their regulations to stem large inflows of capital. Austria proposed to revalue its currency
to avoid an unwanted inflow of speculative capital, and the Swiss authorities announced
a revaluation of the Swiss franc for the same reason.
These measures did little to quiet the turmoil in the foreign exchange markets. In
July and early August, an even more massive flow of funds from dollars into foreign cur-
rencies developed. Moreover, it was not only actions of the private sector that were causes
of concern. By August 15, the U.S. reserve position had deteriorated to such an extent
that its liabilities to foreign official authorities exceeded U.S. official reserves by almost
$30 billion. A number of countries that had traditionally held dollars in their reserves
began to present increasing amounts of dollars to the U.S. Treasury for conversion into
gold. There had been a long time perception that the dollar was "as good as gold." That
this perception had grown up, was in part due to the U.S. undertaking to exchange gold
for dollars that were presented to it by official monetary authorities. This perception,
and the underlying undertaking, had encouraged foreign monetary authorities to keep
large portions of their official reserves in U.S. dollars. But the perception fostered by
the adage had worked only too well. Ultimately, the dollar balances of foreign monetary
authorities exceeded the U.S. gold reserves, and some of the authorities began to eye the
dwindling U.S. stocks with apprehension and misgiving. What if a number of authorities
presented their claims at the same time? How could the U.S. authorities satisfy all of the
country's creditors simultaneously? A foreign monetary authority had responsibility for
the safety of its own nation's reserves. Should it wait while others took the initiative,
and then find itself at the end of the line when the U.S. gold stock was exhausted? A
growing number of countries began to present more of their dollar holdings to the U.S.
Treasury for conversion into gold. A gold rush seemed to be imminent. Perhaps the par
value system, which had seemingly performed so well, had built into it its own seeds of
destruction: when the dollar had been perceived as good as gold, countries were content
to increase their holdings of dollars, but when other countries followed suit, and total
holdings of dollars came to exceed the gold stocks of the United States, some countries
began to act on a changing perception of risk.
On Sunday evening, August 15, 1971, President Nixon announced a series of mea-
sures. Among these was the restriction of the conversion into gold of dollars held by
foreign monetary authorities. The United States would no longer, for the settlement of
international transactions, freely buy and sell gold as it had undertaken under the Fund
Articles. The gold window had been shut. Furthermore, the United States would not
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take other steps to defend its currency within the defined margins. As Gold subsequently
wrote:
The U.S. President's announcement meant that the United States had decided to take an
action that could not be reconciled with the Articles. What was the breach involved in this
action? It may seem strange that the violation was not the withdrawal by the United States of
its declared willingness to buy and sell gold freely for dollars with the monetary authorities of
other members for the settlement of international transactions, even though the undertaking
had become the real foundation of the system. The undertaking was voluntary. The violation
was the refusal of the United States to take other appropriate measures to confine transactions
in U.S. territories involving exchanges of dollars, and the currencies of other members within
margins that were consistent with the Articles.
32
With some key members of the Fund adopting floating rates, and the U.S. refusing
to take measures to defend the dollar, other countries also abandoned their obligations
to defend their currencies. International trade had grown by leaps and bounds under
the par value system, and many economists believed that there was a causal relationship
between stable exchange rates and the expansion of trade. Some believed that the sudden
end of the par value system could only be followed by crisis, with the ugly threat of a
return to the economic practices that had characterized the era of the nineteen thirties.
Currencies floated, some in harmony with others, some by themselves, some in free
float, others attempting by intervention to maintain a controlled float. Despite the chaos
in the exchange markets, however, the worst fears of the economists were not realized.
With the central obligations of the par value system suspended indefinitely, a legal void
loomed. Would the remainder of the Fund Agreement fail, or could some action be
taken to save it?
Gold realized the dangers inherent in a legal vacuum and counseled their contain-
ment. The chaos of the thirties could not be allowed to reassert itself. Looking back on
this period of uncertainty, Gold subsequently wrote:
One of the dangers of prolonged illegality, is that breaches of obligation by some contract-
ing parties will encourage them, or other contracting parties to commit breaches of other
obligations, even when there is no legal doctrine of reciprocity under the treaty to justify
these breaches. The preference for legality may tempt some contacting parties to argue, or
even to act on the contention, that they have been freed by law from inconvenient treaty
obligations, even before the due process of amendment has been completed. The damage to
international law by breaches of obligation is aggravated by unsound doctrine designed to
clear the breaches of the odium of illegality."
32. Gold, "Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements" 77 AM. I. INT'L
L. 443, at 447 (1983). Gold further noted: "Another violation was the refusal of the United
States to convert official holdings of dollars in accordance with the complex, but limited,
obligation of official convertibility under Article VIII, section 4 that all embers had to observe
once they undertook to perform the obligations of convertibility under Article VIII, sections
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them at a later date"
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There was language in the Fund's Articles that mandated a duty of collaboration
from its member countries. In considering this language in Article IV, Section 4(a), Gold
wrote: "After August 15, 1971, the provision became almost the only source of authority
for the Fund's efforts to adapt itself to a situation in which some major assumptions of
the Articles had suffered seismic shock, and to control the dangers inherent in widespread
illegality.'34
There was no time to lose. The Fund took a decision that was cabled to all its mem-
bers. Taking note of the crisis, the decision simultaneously reminded members of their
continuing obligations. Since one of the obligations of members was that of collabora-
tion with the Fund to preserve the objectives of the Articles, the decision emphasized
"the undertaking of members to collaborate with it to promote exchange stability, to
maintain orderly exchange arrangements with other members, and to avoid competitive
exchange alterations ... "
The strategy was effective to contain the damage. The members did collaborate. They
met together at the Fund's annual meeting in September amid somber talk of the possi-
bility of a trade war. Nevertheless, discussions were never broken off. They proceeded in
many forums. The finance ministers and central bank governors met in Washington in
December 1971 to hammer out the Smithsonian Agreement, which envisaged devalua-
tion of the dollar and, for countries unwilling to observe their former par values, a new
set of extra-legal "central rates," as well as wider margins, than those of the Articles for
all members. Central rates were communicated to the Fund by twenty-eight members
that, while not maintaining rates based on their former par values, were nevertheless
declaring their intention to maintain rates for spot transactions within the new maxi-
mum margins. The measures had saved the day until a more permanent solution could
be crafted. They allowed a number of the Fund's members to realign their rates within
an acceptable flexibility, while the majority of the Fund's members kept their exchange
rates unchanged in terms of their intervention currency, without availing themselves of
the wider margins.
The official history of the Fund described the quasi-legal innovations as follows: Central rate
was not a term used in the Articles of Agreement. Moreover, under the existing Articles,
the Fund lacked the authority to substitute wider margins for those specified in Article IV,
Section 3. However, the legal basis for a temporary regime of wider margins and central rates,
according to the General Counsel, was Article I (iii) and Article IV, Section 4(a), relating to
the basic purposes of the Fund, and to members' obligations to collaborate with the Fund in
order to promote exchange stability, to maintain orderly exchange arrangements, and to avoid
competitive exchange alterations. According to the General Counsel, in situations in which
members did not observe sections 3 and 4(b) of Article IV, it was Section 4(a) of Article IV
that was the main provision under which the Fund and members could collaborate, in order
to do their utmost to preserve the objectives of the Articles .... 35
The day, may thus have been saved and the world allowed a breathing space. But a
more permanent solution would have to be found. The Smithsonian Agreement unrav-
eled rapidly. A number of members returned to floating rates, and on February 12, 1973
34. GOLD, supra, note 32 at 35.
35. DE VRiEs THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND 1966-71, at 558 (1976).
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the United States proposed a further devaluation of the dollar that became effective in
October of that year. Many negotiations followed. Ultimately the provisions that were to
become the Second Amendment to the Fund's Articles would be agreed.
VIII. The Second Amendment to the Fund's Articles
of Agreement: Gold's Role as Chief Legal Draftsman
The Second Amendment, which came into effect in April 1978, involved extensive
amendments to the Fund's Articles. It is not possible here to explore all of their many
manifestations. A few of the changes may be mentioned that are relevant to the narrative
of this paper. Comprehensive new provisions were incorporated to reduce the role of
gold in the international monetary system, and to make the SDR the principal reserve
asset of that system. Gold would no longer be the common denominator for par values
(which have disappeared during the current regime), and the SDR is no longer valued
in relation to gold. Payment of one quarter of the subscription of a member is no longer
in gold. It is paid in SDRs, foreign currencies, or the member's own currency. There is
no longer recognition of an official price of gold. Thus, sales of gold by the Fund are to
take place on the basis of market prices. Improvements were made in the SDR, with the
intent of providing greater freedom in its use. The par value system is gone, although
there is a possibility of its being called back into existence in a very different form. In
place of the old rigid rules, there is recognition that members may select the exchange
rate arrangements of their choice. These may include the maintenance by a member,
of a value for its currency in terms of the SDR or another denominator, other than
gold, or in relation to the value of the currency of another member, or other exchange
arrangements. Floating exchange rates are no longer barred. The obligation to collaborate
with the Fund has been retained, and additional content has been incorporated into it.
The Fund is to exercise firm surveillance over the exchange rate policies of members,
and adopt specific principles for the guidance of all members. A Council may be called
into existence through a qualified decision of the Board of Governors. In addition, the
Second Amendment contained provisions that modernized the financial transactions and
operations of the Fund. It also increased the number of decisions that must be taken by
qualified majorities.
Gold served as the chief draftsman of the Second Amendment. He also took a leading
part in the negotiations that produced the agreements and compromises, serving on
various working groups, writing memoranda, and explaining the proposals to member
government officials. The task of developing the new amendment was long and arduous.
Gold summarized the effort: "When the Second Amendment of the Articles of Agreement
of the International Monetary Fund took effect, one of the most extensive and laborious
revisions of a major multilateral treaty had been completed."36 The Managing Director,
Mr. Pierre-Paul Schweitzer, had stressed that the amended Articles must have a flexibility
that was lacking in their predecessor. He had said:
[N]ew arrangements will have to be flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances
and unforeseen developments. As far as possible, they should be based on broad principles,
36. Gold, supra, note 32 at 4.
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rather than over-elaborate formulae. We must be prepared, therefore, to equip the central
institution of the system with the power to adapt itself to developing circumstances, and to
deal quickly with crises should they nevertheless arise.37
Gold and his colleagues responded to the challenge. When the exercise was finished,
he characterized the result as a "conscious effort ... to draft in terms of broad principles
and to leave scope for the development of policy." He knew that the Fund and, indeed,
the international monetary system were not merely a scholarly amalgam of economics
and law, however essential these ingredients. There was always the need to recognize the
role of politics. He wrote:
In a number of provisions, the Fund is instructed to adopt policies for the conduct of certain
operations and transactions without any indication of what those policies might be. The flex-
ibility that is a feature of some provisions, however, must be attributed not to reason, but to
a failure to reach full agreement. The discordance responsible for this flexibility, may produce
better results than the harmony that has permitted the incorporation in both the First and
Second Amendments, of certain policies that had already been developed by practice ... 38
In the end, he was optimistic that the laborious revisions of the Fund's Articles
would provide a new and sounder basis upon which to construct the principles and
practice of an orderly international monetary system.
IX. Epilogue
Gold continued to write and to lecture following his retirement as General Counsel.
Articles, books, and correspondence flowed from his pen. He maintained an office in
the Fund, and sought to resist the encroachments of age through continuing dedication
to the work he had loved so long and so well. The years passed. In time, he suffered a
series of strokes that left him with a severe limp, but diminished neither his fervor nor
his wit. He lamented the days that illness and the advancing years stole from his long
established regime. But the biblical prophecy of the end of days is stayed for no man:
Or ever the silver cord be loosed, or the golden bowl be broken, or the pitcher be broken at
the fountain, or the wheel broken at the cistern. Then shall the dust return to the earth as it
was ....
Gold died during the millennial year at the age of 87, full of years and accomplish-
ment. His life had spanned the two great wars and the intervening depression. It had
also encompassed the postwar era, by which time he was able to play an important role
in his chosen field of international monetary law.
In the 1930s there had been little jurisprudence that served as a basis for the inter-
national monetary system, and little infrastructure that could properly be called an inter-
national civil service. It was at that time, that the Great Depression spread unhindered
from one country to another, like an epidemic casting its shadow over the economics
and politics of the times. Deterioratifig economic conditions, and the rise of lawlessness
37. IMF SURVEY, vol. 2 (1973) 203 , quoted in Gold, supra, at 25.
38. Gold, supra, note 32 at 27.
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among men had led, ultimately, to the disregard for law by their governments. Even as
prosperity and law tend to go hand in hand, so poverty and lawlessness are handmaid-
ens, as well. The chaos and misery of the times had contributed to the causes of the
Second World War.
After the war, a new attempt had been made to found a true international monetary
system based on principles of law. It worked well for a quarter of a century. When
it finally broke, there was a competent and experienced international civil service that
proved instrumental in guarding against a return to the mistakes of the thirties. It was
able to contribute to the reconstitution of a new and improved international monetary
system that is with us today. Crises have not been abolished and are sure to recur, for we
live in accelerating times. But the jurisprudence and institutional knowledge are available
to deal with them.

